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ABSTRACT
Federal regulators characterize capital forbearance as an efficient way of nursing weak
banks and thrifts back to health. An alternative hypothesis is that forbearance reflects inefficient
costs of agency that fall on federal deposit-insurance funds.
Divergences between regulatory measures of a troubled institution's net worth and OAAP
and market-value measures relieved FSLIC from having to book de facto encumbrances that
industry losses were imposing on the FSUC fund. This omission protected the reputations and
careers of top officials.
Delays in insolvency resolution intensified FSLIC exposure to future losses by distorting
management and risk-taking incentives and squeezing profit margins for surviving thrifts.
Besides accumulating projects with negative net present value, delay hurt FSLIC indirectly by
undermining the average profitability of the industry it insured.
This paper seeks to measure the opportunity cost of FSLIC forbearance during 1985-1989.
Although the opportunity cost of delay did not increase every year, it did increase on avenge.
Had opportunity-cost standards of capital adequacy been routinely enforced, FSLIC guarantees
would not have displaced private capital on a mammoth scale, surviving members of the industry
would have proven more profitable, and investments in commercial real estate would have been
restrained.
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I. Introduction
In financial usage, forbearance describes a policy of leniency or indulgence in
enforcing a collectableclaimagainst another party. Deposit-institution regulators engage in
capital forbearance when they do not require recognizable shortages of private ownership
capital at decapitalized institutions to be resolved in quick order either by new injections of
ownership capital, by government takeover, or by liquidation.
In the late 1970s and 1980s, troubled institutions were almost never resolved when
they first became insolvent. On average, Cole (1993) finds that thrifts resolved dtiring
1980-88 had been insolvent on a GAAP accounting basis for roughly 18 months. Kane
(1987), Kaufman (1987), Brumbaugh (1988), Barth (1991), and others have argued that
FSLIC (the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation) adopted forbearance as a
strategy of regulatory gambling that sought to buy time to expand opportunities for growth
and good luck to make crippled thrifts well again.
Federal regulators of depository institutions characterize capital forbearance as an
efficient way of nursing weak banks and thrifts back to health. But Kane (1987, 1989)
argues that the let-it-ride speculative strategy that FSLIC followed is a poorly balanced bet
Both cx ante and cx post the strategy rewarded managers and owners of a few lucky
institutions and increased the aggregate bill to taxpayers for resolving insolvencies.
Analysis of the cost and benefits of FSLIC forbearance has begun to narrow this
disagreement. Bartholomew (1991), DeGennaro and Thomson (1992), and Benston and
Carhill (1992) each analyze the cx post costs of FSUC forbearance.
For 1130 thrifts that were resolved during the period 1980 through 1990.
Bartholomew (1991) compares cx post resolution costs with projected costs of prompt
regulatory intervention. Bartholomews calculations assign substantial cost to forbearance
policies, but neglect potential benefits to FSLIC from gambles placed on troubled thrifts
that managed to return to health. Studying costs of forbearance only for failed thrifts
creates a selection bias because returns from insolvent thrifts that manage to recover are
systematically excluded. Although accounting for this class of net returns could lower
For helpful comments on an earlier draft, the authors wish to thank kebel Cole, Robert Praseb, and
James Thomson.2
estimated net costs of forbearance, gains accruing to recovering thrifts flow
disproportionately to private stalceholders.
DeGennaro and Thomson (1992) avoid selection bias by studying longitudinally the
fates of 952 thnfts that failed to meet regulatory capital standards at the end of 1979. They,
too, find a cost discrepancy ($6 billion to $12 billion) between a hypothetical strategy of
prompt resolution and the present value of the delayed resolution costs experienced in these
thrifts. Their sample's starting date seems aptly chosen, in that it captures the immediate
effect on thrift net worths of the increased interest volatility created by the Voicker Fed's
post-October 6, 1979 attack on inflation and precedes 1980 and 1982 legislation that
intensified supervisory forbearance. Nevertheless, whether earlier or later starting dates
might produce different qualitative results is an open question. It is particularly desirable to
confront White's claim (1991, p. 141) that "by 1986 it was too late for the FSLIC to cut its
losses by much."
Although Rudolph (1989) does not measure forbearance costs per se. her work
may be interpreted as showing that DeGennaro and Thomson's results may be insensitive
to a 3-year delay in starting point. She finds that, by 1987, of 237 thrifts that were
insolvent by Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) in 1982, 92 had been
merged or closed and 77 more remained insolvent and still supported by government-
contributed capital. Only 68 had regained GAAP solvency, and some of these had done so
(as a nonforbearance policy would have required) by raising external capital.
These studies measure a thrift's initial capital shortage by accounting standards.
Many thrifts that were book-value solvent during FSLICs last decade could be proved to
have been economically insolvent by more comprehensive methods of measurement. The
effects of using still-later starting dates and a mom-inclusive market-value standard for
solvency is investigated in Benston and Carhill (1992) and in this paper. Analyzing
forbearance costs with data from 1985-1989 Thrift Financial Reports, Benston and Carhill
interpret regression evidence to support regulators' presumption that, as away of nursing
hundreds of damaged thrifts back to health, forbearance proved expost to be a profitable
strategy for taxpayers. The heart of their argument is demonstrating that many troubled
institutions chose not to pursue excessively risky strategies.
This paper uses the same data source as Benston and Carkill, but measures
aggregate opportunity costs of forbearance directly. A narrative description of capital
adequacy restrictions for U.S. thrifts is presented in Section II. How to benchmark an
appropriate loss-resolution strategy is discussed in Section III. The data set is introduced3
inSection IV. Methodsfor constructingsynthetic market-value measurements are
describedinSection V. Opportunity costs of FSUC forbearance are compiled in Section
VI. Finally, Section VII provides a summary interpretation of the results.
IL Narrative Summary of Capital Adequacy Policies for U.S. S&Ls
Between 1965 and 1982, an unanticipated secular rise in interest rates imposed
significant opportunity losses on most thrifts. These losses came mainly from unbooked
declines in the market value of long-term, fixed-nit mortgage loans. By 1982,415 thrifts
reported themselves to be insolvent on a tangible historical-cost basis. Setting aside the
intangible value of the taxpayer guarantees that insolvent thrifts enjoyed, many more thrifts
could have been shown to be insolvent on a marked-to-market basis.
The Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) and FSUC were slow to
acknowledge and treat the extent of economic insolvency among thrifts. To help insolvent
thrifts to avoid failing regulatory tests for capital adequacy, FHLBB authorized the booking
of inflated amounts of goodwill in supervisory mergers, eased capital requirements and
authorized cosmetic accounting entries. The Bank Board lowered book-value net worth
requirements, from S patent to4 percent in November 1980 and lowered them again to 3
percent in January of 1982. In 1981 and 1982, the Bank Board authorized adjustments in
Regulatory Accounting Principles (RAP) that allowed thrift net worth to be reported
substantially more leniently than GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) would
have required. Divergences between net worth as measured by RAP, GAAP, and market
value relieved FSLIC from explicitly having to acknowledge the depth of the indusnys
unbooked losses (White, 1990) and made it easier for FSLIC itself to avoid booking the de
facto encumbrances that these losses imposed on the FSLIC fund.
Not resolving insolvencies as they developed not only failed to erase FSUCs
accumulated losses, delayed insolvency resolution intensified its exposure to future losses
by distorting risk-taking incentives (Buser, Chen, and Kane, 1981) and narrowing profit
margins at surviving thrifts. Decapitalized institutions face incentives to bid
overaggressively for additional deposits and for risky projects. For a deeply troubled
deposit institution, the downside risks of new investments fall predominantly on its
guarantor. Besides directly accruing projects with negative net present value for FSLIC,
this bidding also hun FSLIC indirectly by undermining the profitability of the entire
industry it insured.
In the early 1980s, two pieces of legislation expanded opportunities for an insoh'ent4
firmto gamble its way out of a capital shortage. The DIDMCA (Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act, 1980) and the DIA (Garn-St Germain Depository
Institution Act, 1982). This legislation relaxed restrictions on deposit interest rates and
authorizednew thriftlending and investment activities. The new environment made
undercapitalized thrifts more dangerous than ever for the FSLIC fund. Making
decapitalized institutions freer to compete for out-of-region deposits and to take risks in
new ways demanded tighter rather than easier supervision. Even though corporate fmance
theory predicts that lenient treatment of decapitalized "zombie" thrifts would encourage
looting and high-risk lending, regulators gambled that zombie managers could be relied
upon to find a safe way to grow out of their problems. Although it was the effect of
interest volatility on residential mortgage loans that initially pushed the industry into deep
insolvency, interest-rate volatility declined greatly after 1983. By then, credit risk in thrift
assets had become a mounting problem. Repayment difficulties proved especially acute for
loans and investments in commercial real estate.
III. Advantages orUsinga Market-ValueClosure Rule
Directcosts of forbearance depend on assumed supervisory strategies for
disciplining and correcting institutional insolvencies. This paper develops opportunity cost
estimates relative to a straightforward strategy: any insured firm is to be promptly
recapitalized, sold, taken over, or closed whenever the market value of its tangible net
worth fails to exceed zero. An even better criterion would set the threshold for capital
correction equal to the sum of administrative costs the insurer faces in disposing of
institutions with the selected capital ratio. Except that the insurer's avenge disposition cost
should decrease as a firm's net capital position rises, costs of forbearance can be
benchmarked straightforwardly on either assumption.
Our hypothetical benchmark is consistent with corporate-finance principles and
embodies the market-value recommendations and prompt-corrective-action provisions
contained in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991
(FDICIA, U.S. Public Law 102-242, December 19, 1991). Prompt-corrective-action
provisions seek to limit regulatory discretion to forbear. FDICIA mandates prompt
intervention to resolve undercapitalized situations and insists that closures be financed at the
"least possible cost to the deposit-insurance fund." Prompt regulatory action seeks to
eliminate "zombie" institutions by pushing banking authorities toward the closure patterns
that an efficient private guarantor would enforce. Prolonged delays in corrective action5
arguably permittedzombieS&Lstoextract the life blood fromindustry profit margins and
ultimately from FSLIC itself
IV. Data Source
Thrift Financial Reports are financial statements which every member institution
was required to file with the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB or Bank Board).
Reports were submitted semi-annually from 1977 through the end of 1983 and submitted
quarterly beginninginMarch 1984. Report content and format were revised frequently by
the Bank Board and its successor institution.
This study analyzes quarterly reports filed from 1985 through 1989. Study
endpoints are dictated by difficulties in adapting the 1984 format to our purposes and by the
August. 1989 demise of FSLIC. During the focal 1985-1989 period, three reporting
formats may be distinguished: the 1985 and 1986 formats; the 1987 and 1988 formats; and
the 1989 format.
End-of-quarter data on thrift assets, liabilities and capital are found in Section A, B
and C of Thrift Financial Reports. Sections D and E provide income and expense data.
Supplemental monthly data and information on interest rates paid and account balances are
reported for selected types of deposits in Section F and G. Section H reports information
on the time remaining before the yields on specific assets and specific liabilities
contractually reprice. This section also states average contractual yields on different
categories of assets and liabilities arranged by term to maturity. This last section first
appeared in March 1984.
V. Market-Value Measurement
We use synthetic market-value accounting methods developed in Kane and Yu
(1992) to benchmark the effects of the hypothetical market-value resolution strategy and to
estimate losses imbedded in every thrift operating insolvently at five reporting dates.'
Neglecting the cost of liquifying the various positions, current values for the major
components of thrift asset and liability portfolios are estimated at eath reporting institution
and aggregated across its balance sheet to obtain a synthetic measure of net worth for each
FSLIC-insured thrift The objective is to execute, as far as reporting limitations permit, a
1The valuation procedure projects and discounts returns across an S&Ls balance sheet. An appendix is
availablefrom the authorsthat describes portfolio categories and the results of some sensitivity
experiments.6
present-valuediscountingof returns that could rationally be projected fromreported cash
flowsfor assets and contractual cash flows for liabilities. An asset's reported cash flows
respond to both interest-rate movements and credit problems. Contractual cash flows are
used in valuing liabilities on the hypothesis that their occurrence is more secure. Their
discounted value is affected mainly by movements in interest rates and only marginally by
changing fears of nonperformance. Insured S&L liabilities are free of credit risk, while the
market's understanding of forbearance policies greatly reduced the default risk perceived
for uninsured obligations.
This study classifies assets into eleven portfolio categories ("subportfolios") and
liabilities into five subportfolios. The timing information provided in Section H is used to
partitioneach subportfolio intoeight finer maturity/repricing subportfolios, each ranked
according to theremaining timeeither to maturity or to repricing. Assets and liabilities in
each maturity/repricingsubportfolioare assigned a putative maturity equal to the midpoint
of its maturity/repricing bracket. The midpoints of the eightmaturity/repricingcolumns are
1.5 months, 4.5 months. 9 months, 24 months, 48 months, 90 months, 180 months and
300months.
Asset Subportfo!ios
Eleven principal asset subportfolios are distinguished: Mortgage Loans and
Contracts (MTG), Mortgage-backed Pass-through Securities (MBPT), Consumer Loans
(CSL), Commercial Loans (CML), Financing Leasing (FL), Repossessed Assets and Real
Estate Held for Investment (REOH), Service Corporations and Subsidiaries (SCS),
Investment Securities (ATIS), Leased Property (LSO), Mortgage Loan Servicing (MLS)
and Fixed Assets. This partition is dictated by limitations on ourability to match asset
categories with actual or contractual cash flows reported in the Thrift Financial Reports.
Rather than neglect items that cannot be matched with identifiable cash flowsor putative
price quotes, such assets and liabilities axe carried at book value.
MTCI and MBPT are treated as amortizing insnments subject to possible interim
prepayment. Prepayments are assumed to occur at the end of each period. A 10 percent
annualized prepayment rate is assumed for mortgage assets whose returns differ from
current mortgage yields by exactly one-hundred basis points. Prepayment rates of 20
percent and 5 percent are assumed for mortgage rates whose contractual rate is respectively
greater or less than the current market yield by one-hundred basis points or more. This
assumption resembles procedures used by Brewer (1987) and Bennett, eta!. (1986).
Loans in CSL, CML, FL and LSO and investment securities experience little7
prepayment. This study amortizes consumer loans, commercial loans and financing leases
on the assumption of no prepayments. Investment Securities (ATIS) include government
and agency securities, mortgage derivatives and equities. Since most of these securities are
nonarnortizing. their current values are measured by discounting coupon flows at a
designated market rate of return. Prepayrnents arc also excludedon investmentsecurity
subportfolios.
The values of both real estate subportfolios, REO and REOR, are markedup or
down by peitentage movements in a price index for commercial real estate. The price
index used is compiled by Frank Russell Company, as reproduced by White (1989, 1990).
Because this index substantially understates rational estimates of the decline in collateral
values during 1985-1989 (Hendershott and Kane, 1993), this is a lenient mark-to-market
procedure that tenth to shift some asset-revaluation expense into disposition costs.
Market rates of return are required to discount projected cash flows. We conceive
of market rates of return as rates of return that industry members could feasibly earn on
designated subportfolios. This conception lets us treat market rates ofreturns as
benchmark estimates of opportunity-cost rates of return that can be earned on specific
assets. Assets that undeçuerform the feasible return are considered to experience a partial
default, while assets that outperform the feasible return are marked up proportionately.
One feasible industry benchmark is the avenge rare of return on asset subportfolios
for all reporting institutions. At a time when many members of the industry are amortizing
unbooked losses, industry avenges can understate return possibilities for healthy firms.
Taking the opportunity-cost rate as the average return earned by well-capitalized thrifts
strikes us as a sounder procedure than avenging subportfolio returns for all thrifts.
Focusing on well-capitalized thrifts excludes distortions in reported returns from present
and past excess risk-taking by zombie thrifts. Our preferred method defines as well-
capitalized any thrift whose tangible net worth ratio exceeds 6 percent of assets.
Liability Subnortfolios
Liabilities are classified into five categories: Borrowings. Interest-Bearing Fixed-
Maturity Deposits, Noninterest-Hearing Accounts, "Core" Deposits, and Other Liabilities.
The last two categories primarily consist of short-term liabilities and are assigned their book
values. Discounted cash-flow methods assign marker values only to the other three
groupings.
Just as we partitioned asset subportfolios, we subdivide each liability subportfolio
into eight maturity subcategories. Each "basis" subportfolio corresponds to the intersection8
of a single maturity/repricing column in Section H with a single liability-categoryrow. The
midpoint of each column is taken to be the maturity date. For each institution, each
maturity/repricing subportfolio is assigned a calculated weighted-avenge contractual return.
The discount rates used incorporate two primary influences: interest-race
movements and changes in the value of issuing institutions' options to default Even for
uninsured liabilities, movement in default probabilities is substantially restricted by
authorities' known preferences for delaying failures and for utilizing "live-thrift" purchase
and assumption transactions to dispose of failed institutions.
At each repricing date, the interest rates that well-capitalized thrifts offer on new
large CDs are taken to be the opportunity cost rates of thrift liability portfolios. Source
documents define new-CD rates as interest rates offered by thrifts in the last seven days of
each reporting quarter. For well-capitalized institutions, new CDs constitute a ready
funding substitute for other liabilities.
Most large CDs have an initial maturity of less than a year. The secondary market
for CDs is reputed to lack depth beyond the 6-month maturity. For thesereasons, proxy
interest rates have to be developed with which to discount the cash flows placed in the
windows spanning months 9 through 300. A proxy CD yield curve is constructed in two
steps. First, at each reporting date, a spread is calculated between the CD rate of the
longest maturity then observed and a Treasury yield of corresponding maturity. Data given
for the longest secondary-market CDs are placedat 6 months and for new large CDs at 9
months. A series of longer yields axe generated by adding calculated spreads to pointson
the Treasury yield curve from months 6 or 9 on. Treasury-yield-curve dataare interpolated
from the constant-maturity series published in the Federal Reserve Bulletin;
Cash flows projectable for the Borrowings categories are relatively well-defined
contractually. The implied cash flows are discounted at the CD yield assigned to that
maturity window. Possibilities of prepayment are ignored for borrowings. As with all
other adjustable-rate instruments, in each repricing/maturity column,long-term adjustable-
rate borrowings resemble short-term fixed-rate borrowings in repricing behavior. Reported
balances are treated as fixed-rate borrowings which either compoundannually at the
reported contractual rate or accumulate simple interest if the term is a year or less. As with
assets, maturity dates are benchmarked at the midpoint of each repricing column. It is
assumed that, at maturity, accrued interest is credited and the entire balance withdrawn.
Interest-Beprjn2 Fixed-Maturity Deposits
Balances of interest-bearing, fixed-maturity deposits are divided into large and9
small CDs. Small CDs differ from large CDs in contractual interest rates and in
possibilities for early withdrawal.SmallCDs are defined in this study as CDs with
balances of less than $100 thousand; large CDs are defined as those with balances of $ICX)
thousand or more. Small CDs are explicitly insured in full and brought in chieflythrough
an institution's retail network Insurance on large CDs is predominantly implicit in
character (Thomson, 1987).
We use distinct yield curves for small and large CDs to assign market values to
these instruments. Large CDs generally show higher contractual interest rates than small
CDs. In early 1987-1989, the average discrepancies are 19.9 and 17.7 basis points for 4.5
monthsand 9 months respectively. Implicit interest expense represents a notable portion of
the cost of servicing small CDs. Differences of 15 to 20 basis points couldrepresent quasi-
rents, but might be easily attributed to: (1) the improved insurance status of small CDs and
(2) higher operating costs of maintaining, closing and opening accounts and of making
interest payments on retail instruments.
However, small CDs differ from large CDs also in the option value banks must
assign to early withdrawal opportunities. Small Cs aie also less sensitive to interest-rate
movements than large CDs axe. Our calculations assume small CDs are never withdrawn
early and large CDs are withdrawn once it becomes profitable for depositors to do so.
Early withdrawaj is profitable for large-CD holders whenever they can realize a net gain in
value by paying the early withdrawal penalty on a below-market CD rate and reinvesting
the balance at the current interest rate. In practice, the operative penalty formula generally
required forfeiture of 3 months1 interest for CDs whose maturities ran between 32 days and
1 year, and 6 months1 and 9 months' forfeiture for maturities of 1 to 3 years and of more
than 3 years, respectively. With information only on remaining maturity, our calculations
conservatively assume that early withdrawal penalties require the respective forfeiture of:
six-months interest for CI)s with a remaining maturity less than a year; 9-months interest
for CDs with a remaining maturity of 1 to 3 years; and one additional month of interest for
each additional year (or fraction of a year) of remaining maturity beyond 3years. For
deposits that are withdrawn early, our methods assume savings institutions deduct the
penalties and refinance the net balances at fresh CD rates.
Adding imputed market values across an institution's asset and liability
subportfolios generates a net worth estimate that is designated here as "synthetic market-
value net worth." Summary measures of the extent of synthetic market-value insolvency at
FSLIC insured thrifts are reported in Table I. During the sample period, the number of10
market-value insolvent thrifts fluctuates between 23 percent and 37 peitent of the industry.
Line (3) shows that the sum of insolvent firms'negativemarket-value net worth peaked at
the end of 1988. However, the annual cost of an unpaid 20 percent annual equity return
(representing a conservative estimate of the cost of equity capital supplied to zombie thrifts)
should be cumulated intoFSLICsimplicit investment position. Line (3c) clarifies that,
even without keeping track of pre-1986 dividends, making this allowance helps push the
cost of eliminating unresolved cases tohigher and higher levels throughout FSLICs last
years.
VI. Measuring the Opportunity Costs of Forbearance
To determine the opportunity costs of FSLIC forbearance, we must track the net
"waiting costs" generated by rolled-over forbearance based on the hypothetical costs of
following a putatively optimal strategy of insurer loss control. In principle, the benchmark
for optimal loss control is what a prudent private creditor or guarantor would require in
similar circumstances.
Creditors in U.S. deposit institutions cannot draw on the protection of bankruptcy
courts. It is reasonable to hypothesize that a prudent private insurer would demand --as the
FDIC Improvement Act of 1991 now requires— that as insolvent firms approach
insolvency, they either recapitalize promptly or surrender most (if not all) of their
ownership claims to the insurer. If a firm facing such a capital directive were to fail to raise
sufficient capital in short order, the insurer would either liquidate it, sell it to a third-party
acquirer, or greatly dilute the proportion of future profits that the institution's original
stakeholders could subsequently claim.
The optimal disposition strategy is what the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991
approximates as the prompt" and "least-cost resolution" of an institution's insolvency. A
private guarantor would never liquidate an institution whose value as a going concern --
abstractingfrom capitalized deposit-insurance subsidies-- substantially exceeded the
marked-to-market value of its tangible asset and liability positions.
The accounting literature describes the difference between a firm's worth as a going
concern and the marked-to-market value of its GAAP balance sheet as intangible
"goodwill." The finance literature describes this difference as "franchise value." Both
literatures treat this difference as the present discounted value of excess earnings (quasi-
rents) that the firm can earn on its balance sheet because of its having previously expended
resources to develop a loyal customer base, excellent office locations, special management11
skills, or future opportunities to innovate.
A prudent private insurer would defer resolution only when it deemed an institution
to be bothtoovaluable to liquidate and too inconvenient --given insurer itliquidity, asset
and franchise disposition costs, and the press of transacting other business-- to sell off at
the moment. In cases of deferred resolution, efficient loss-control would assign the insurer
a well-structured contractual claim to potential future returns. This claim would be
formalized either in new stock shares or in warrants. The equity returns that FSLIC passed
up in not staking an optimal equity position for itself axe an important implicit cost of its
forbearance strategies. FSLIC forbearance provided dividend-free equity to very risky
firms and even to Ponzi operations. The costs of this equity is best accounted, as Table 1111
does, at appropriate equity rates of return and not (as DeGennam and Thomson
conservatively do) at interest rates on government bonds. Thrifts whose insolvency was
hidden were free to pay interim dividends to private "owners" and to pay generous wages
to managers during the forbearance period. It is particularly important to book the
opportunity cost of FSLIC equity in cases where thrifts eventually returned to profitable
operation without explicit assistance. The inability of FSUC to capture more than a
fraction of the winnings recovering thrifts accnied is precisely what made capital
forbearance so costly to taxpayers. Bond rates may be used (as Deo3ennaro and Thomson
do use them) to discount late-dared expenses back to an earlier date.
When going-concern value exists, the hypothetical benchmark of prompt liquidation
overstates the costs of optimally disposing of a thrift's losses. On the other hand, in cases
where forbearance has been granted, recorded disposition costs fail to include the
opportunity cost of the equity the government provided to failed and recovering thrifts
during their period of extended insolvency. Additional, but indirect, costs of forbearance
come from loss exposures imposed on the FSLIC fund due to reductions in cx ante
profitability that forbearance causes for all deposit institutions. In what follows, we
analyze how inferences about the cx post benefits of forbearance vary as these additional
value adjustments are introduced.
A. Esrimatin the Costs of Prompt Resolution
Liquidation requires FSLIC to absorb all embedded net worth shortages and to
incur additional costs of asset disposition. Taking over and disposing of thrift assets or
franchises generates a substantial amount of marketing, litigation, and administrative
expense. Disposition costs comprise all losses incurred in resolutions beyond those that12
come from the necessity of marking positions to market as they are sold. Brown and
Epstein (1992) show that at a sample of 1986-88 bank receiverships, these costs tend to be
low on securities and highest on owned real estate and instalment loans.
Properly accounted, the biggest component of potential disposition costs for
forbearance S&Ls would probably be fire-sale losses on poorly performing assets. The
second-biggest would probably be defending FSLIC from lawsuits filed by stakeholders in
failed thrifts. The pressure of resolving large number of insolvencies at high speed would
dispose FSLIC personnel not only to make reasonable price concessions, but to make
potential errors of law and unreasonable concessions that reflect carelessness and
misinformation. Auction theoxy indicates that the extent of price concessions would fall
with the number of interested bidders.
Lines (7), (9), and (10) of Table I assume that per-dollar rates of asset disposition
trend upward year by year. Even though Barth, Bartholomew, and Bradley (1990) find
that the duration of tangible insolvency is the most significant determinant of FSLIC
resolution costs, constant FSLIC disposition costs have previously been used by Kane and
Yu (1992) and DeGennaro and Thomson (1993). DeGennaro and Thomson deduct 0.5
percent of total assets for administrative and legal expenses in vrompt resolutions. They
arrive at 0.5percentby conservatively dividing FSLICs reported direct insurance
settlement and administrative expenses for FSLIC in 1985 and 1986 by total failed thrift
assets in 1985 and 1986 respectively.
FSLIC's estimate includes no allowance for the present value of litigation expense
or for fire-sale losses. There is reason to believe that resolutions undertaicen in these and
most earlier years may have been much simpler to execute than the insolvencies that FSUC
chose to defer.
James (1991) found that legal and administrative expenses associated with bank
closures avenged 10 percent of book-value assets for the FDIC from 1985 through mid-
year 1988. In correspondence, Thomson has argued that this number is far too high. He
calculates the entire legal and administrative expense of the FDIC during James' sample
period as only 3.5 percent of failed-bank assets. It seems likely that some of the expenses
James classifies as "administrative" must be embedded losses realized fonnally as
marketing expense in failed-bank receiverships.
Kane and Yu (1992) employ James' 10 percent assumption, and, with DeGennaro
and Thomson, incorporate one class of fire-sale losses into the market valuationprocess.
This is done by applying price discounts that reflect transactions costs anddelays one must13
anticipate in selling nonfinancial assets such as furniture, fixtures, and equipment (WE)
and poorly documented real estate assets, REQ and REH.
To allow for intangible franchise values that might be realized in the subset of
resolutions effected by purchase-and-assumption transactions, we propose to add back one
percent of the book value of assets. We hold this to be a generous allowance for several
reasons. First, before 1989, reported takeover bids and goodwill allowances were biased
upward by the intangible value of federal deposit-insurance guarantees and by benefits
from tax-loss carryforwards and other tax writeoffs putatively being transferred to
acquirers. Second, the quality of bank asset management and the loyal customer base that
underlie franchise values tend to erode once an institution's durability comes into question.
DeGennaro and Thomson (1992) cite a Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) report that, for
the 651 nonliquidating resolutions RTC assisted between April 10, 1992 and its inception
in August 1989, the average purchase premium over the market value of tangible assets in
successful bids avenged only 2.05 percent of so-called core deposits (those under $80.000
in denomination). Credit standards deteriorate, talented employees depart, and corn
deposits tend to shrink relative to total assets as an institution becomes insolvent As an
institution's insolvency festers, good assets and core deposits axe replaced increasingly by
instruments that generate no quasi-rents. Table II indicates that during the sample period a
substantial portion of observed insolvencies had been operating insolvently since at least
the previous yearend. Table ifi shows that the avenge number of months that failed thrifts
spent in a state of tangible insolvency was rising as well.
As the RTC slowly identified and reprivatized the franchises it chose to rescue, its
reported resolution costs proved fairly high. In its first three years of operation, RTC
resolution costs per dollar of the assets it chose to disgorge avenged 58 percent, 28.4
percent, and 26.1 percent, respectively. Because the thrifts the RTC was resolving had
typically been insolvent for months on end, these cost rates confirm the hypothesis that the
opportunity loss of franchise value in deeply troubled institutions is substantial. Delays
may lead gross and net disposition cost to appear larger cx post than would have been
experienced with a policy of routine early resolution of insolvent cases.
This interpretation is consistent with Barth, Bartholomew, and Labich (1990)
estimates of the broad trend in resolution costs per dollar of assets that FSLIC experienced
before its demise in 1989. High and rising disposition costs indicate an increasing private
disinterest in many of the hard-to-value assets and franchises FSLIC had available to sell.
This growing disinterest was reinforced by the depressing effect on industry profit margins14
that came from determinedly delaying the resolution of problem institutions.
Theunreasonable$242.8 billion cost ofresolving zombies that observed
dispositions generate for 1989 suggests that the extremely high disposition costs observed
in that year are not representative of the costs of resolving FSLICs full caseload. As Table
III shows, only 37 cases were resolved in this year. At least a few of these am known to
have been "selected" for resolution after their especially poor financial condition provoked a
destructive run that forced authorities to act. To allow for the possibility that the caies
chosen for resolution in particular years were easier or harder to market than theavenge
insolvent thrift1 it is useful to conduct sensitivity experiments that use constant hypothetical
rates of per-dollar disposition cost. However, it must be remembered that such
experiments eliminate any trend at all in disposition costs and that the likelihood of such a
trend is part of the qualitative case against letting insolvencies ride.
B. Alternative Soecifications of Incremental Disposition Costs
This section focuses on different ways of calculating what it would have cost
FSLIC incrementally, year by year, to resolve each year's rollover of unresolved
insolvencies. Neglecting unpaid dividends on FSLICs forbearance equity, lines (7) and
(9) of Table I give estimates of incremental liquidation and flexible-resolution costs using
the annual avenge per-dollar disposition costs observed in line (6). Leaving 1989 aside,
these estimates lie between $95 billion and $126 billion. The hypothetical cost of flexibly
resolving flinsolvenciesin a given year can be approximated by adding to line (9) the
reported cost of the cases that were resolved (as given in the second-last column of Table
1111). Line (10) of Table I clarifies that the sharp decline in the cost of resolvingcarxyover
cases in 1988 was due to the great increase in resolution activity in thatyear and not to a
dramatic improvement in aggregate zombie net worth.
Table IV investigates the effect of different disposition-cost rates on the calculated
time path for FSUCs incremental resolution costs. The DeGennaro-Thomson 0.5percent
rate is the easiest to accommodate. As shown in line (2), on this assumption the
incremental costs of "flexible" resolution is the sum of the absolute value of FSLICs
forbearance equity and one-half of one percent of assets resolved. On thisassumption, in
each of its last four years FSLIC could have reprivatized its caseload of zombies for about
$50 billion. In view of what it actually cost to resolve cases in 1988-1992, thisprojection
is implausible on its face.
Using James' assumption, net incremental disposition cost becomes nine percent of
assets. The effects of this assumption are displayed in line (3) of Table IV. It shows15
incrementalresolutioncosts as peaking in 1988 and falling offthereafter.
Finally, using the average of the lowest disposition rates Barth, Bartholomew, and
Labich (1990) observe between 1985 and1991, line (4) assumes that net disposition costs
are15 percent in allyears.On thisassumption, theincremental costs ofresolving all
insolvent cases improved in 1987 but bounced back upin1988.
C. The Effects of Unpaid Dividends and Variations in the Rate of Resolution Activity
The cost of the actual resolutions undertaken each year and the cumulative value of
unpaid dividends on FSLICs forbearance equity axe given in the last two lines of Table IV.
The complete cost of flexibly resolving FSLIC's position in insolvent thrifts inany year is
the sum of costs of incremental liquidations and these two items. Factoring these items into
the picture would, on some assumptions, have made the rollover of the 1986 caseload into
1987a profitable transactionhad surviving insolvencies been resolved then. However, and
contrary to White (1991), leaving the bets on the table into 1988 was a bad move under any
constant disposition-cost ratio.
The calculated reduction in the opportunity cost of resolving remaining zombies in
1989reflectsthe benefits of FSLICs having stepped up the amount of assets resolved
from $10.7billionin 1987to$100.7 billion in 1988.Byitself, theunpaiddividend that
wouldhave been due had the corresponding$27.5billion inforbearance equitynotbeen
eliminated wouldhave added $5.5 billiontoFSLICs 1989 tab.
Assuming 9% per-dollar net disposition costs, industry insolvency and unpaid
dividends could have been completely settled in 1989 for $119.6 billion. With 15%per-
dollar costs, the bill would have been $162.7 billion.
D. Profitability Effects of FSLIC Forbearance
Corporate-finance and industrial-organization theory combine to predict that
FSLICs willingness to supply dividend-free equity capital to insolvent thrifts would lead
their managers to bid industry profit margins to below-equilibrium levels. In turn,
unsustainably low net interest margins on intermediated funds would tend to lower the
amount of private capital in better-capitalized competitors. Over time, this reduction in
industry profit margins spurred increased economic leverage as a way of restoring returns
on private thrift capital to market levels. Both developments must be expected to increase
opportunities for new zombies to move onto FSLICs caseload and to reduce the
proportion of "rolled-over zombies" that manage to recover in any year.
Table V presents year-by-year information on recovering zombies in 1986- 1989.
Aggregating across the four years the number of recovering zombies (747) roughly equals16
the flow of new insolvencies (685). Only in 1987 did the number ofrecovering zombies
exceed the number of new insolvencies. Moreover, only in 1987 was a substantialamount
of positive equity accumulatedat recovering firms ($8.3 billion).Remembering that the
positive equity accrues to the private owners of each recovered enterprise, Table II tells us
that even in 1987 FSLIC gained less than $8 billion in forbearance equity inrecovering
firms. Unpaid dividends on FSLIC forbearance equity substantially exceeded thisgain and
the value of FSLIC exposure to future losses remained highevery year in most recovering
firms.
While it is hard to conclude that the forbearance strategy followed in 1985-1989
actually placed a winning bet, some winning strategies can be devised ex post. Table VI
shows that in 1985-1988 astrategyof deferring theresolutionof roiled-over zombies for
no more than one year would have reaped gross benefits as often as it lost them. However,
even in the windows of opportunity that emerged in 1986 and 1988, it is doubtful that net
benefits can be established. The net value of forbearance depends also on how much
delaying the exit of wrecked firms increased: (1) forbearance equity in new zombies and (2)
contemporary investment in real estate that the macroeconomy has proved unable to absorb.
VII. Summary Implications
Our estimates show that the value of FSLICs forbearance equity did not worsen in
every single year. Nevertheless, because relatively few of FSLICs bets were ever taken
off the table, capital forbearance proved cx post to be a costlystrategy.
Had FHLBB officials routinely enforced opportunity-cost standards of capital
adequacy, they would have prevented FSLICs equity position from displacing private
capital on a mammoth scale and would have improved the profitability of surviving
members of the industry. Resulting reductions in hidden tax liabilities for households and
hidden subsidies to risky lending would have tempered both interim household spending
and the overbuilding of commercial real estate (Congressional Budget Office, 1992;
Shoven, Smart, and Waldfogel, 1992). This would have assisted disinflation and
produced ex post a more valuable capital stock. In many parts of the nation, a legacy of
see-through buildings that undercapitalized thrifts bid frenziedly to finance still retards job
growth.17
TableI
Summary Data on Market-Value (MV)InsolventThrifts and Incremental
Costs of Resolving FSLIC's Annual Carryover of Unresolved Cases, 1985-
1989
Yearend 1985 1986 1987 19881989
(1)No.of MV-Insolvent Firms 1073 1194 868 705 676
(2)BookValue (BV)of Assets(in Sm) 576278 698050 475407 503943492028
(3)MV NetWorth(in Sm) =FSLIC's .31846 -45489 .45783 -50718 -43123
"Forbearance Equity Position
(3a) Annual Opportunity Cost of
Financing at 20% the ... 6,369 9,098 9,157 10,144
"Forbearance Equity Position
FSLIC held at Previous Yearcnd
(in Sm)
(3b) MV Net Worth (in Sm) Including
One Years' Unpaid 20% Dividend ... -51,858 -54,881 -59,875 -53,317
onForbearance Equity Carried
Over into the Year
(3c) MV Net Worth (in Sm), if Unpaid
Dividends Are CumulaLed from .. -51,858 -6,0,956 -70,113 -80,257
1986 on
(4) Forbearance Equity Ratio: (3)/(2) -5.53% -6.52% -9.63% -10.06% -8.76%
(S)ResolutionCostPerDollaxofBv 17,5% 24.6% 34.8%. 31.0% 58.0%
Assets Actually Resolved
(6) Implied Disposition Cost Per Dollac 11.97% 18.08% 25.17% 20.94%49.24%
(5)- I(4)I
(7)Hypothetical Liquidation Costs
(in Sm) Using Per Dollar Disposition 100849 126207 119660 105526 242275
Cost Observed Each Year
= (2) • (5) = (3) + (6) * (2)
(8) Allowance for Capturing Franchise 5763 6980 4754 5039 4920
Values (in Sm) = 1% of line (2)
(9) Incremental Costs of Prompt but 95086 119227 114906 100487 237355
Flexible Disposition (in Sm) = (7) - (8)
(10) Hypothetical Costs of Flexibly 96065 122292 118610 131667 242754
Resolving All Insolvencies (in Sm)Table II
Condition of Market-Value Insolvent Institutions One Year Later
Yearend 1986 1987 1988 1989*




115 107 No. of firms 158 367
BV Total Assets (in Sm) 73449 303353 104258 112789
NetChange(in$m) +10545 +30868 -15359 -11026
MV Net Worth (in Sm) 2705 8263 2892 3170
Net Change (in Sm) +4471 +16010 +4416 +7597
Institutions that Were Insolvent butOpen
467 No. of firms 841 740 531
BY Total Assets (in Sm) 543123 423905 292501 295581
Net Change (in Sm) +47692 +31306 +18925 -23533
MV Net Worth (in Sm) -35116 -41568 -27206 -25059
Net Change (in Sm) -8240 -8298 -2460 -622
Merged or Closed Institutions
222 131 No. of Firms 74 87
Assisted Resolutions**
No. of Firms 46 47 205 37
Resolution Cost (in Sm) 3065 3704 38018@ 5399#
* Asof end of the third quarter
**Source:Barth, Bartholomew, and Labich (1990), p. 23.
@Including18 "stabilizations" with an estimated present-value resolution cost of
56838m.


























1980 11 1,458 5.4 11.5 167 262
1981 28 13,908 5.2 5.5 759 1,091
1982 63 17,662 12.9 4.6 803 1,087
1983 36 4,631 16.4 5.9 275 357
1984 22 5,080 23.4 14.6 743 928
1985 31 5,601 25.9 17.5 979 1,238
1986 46 12,455 30.6 24.6 3,065 3,609
1987 47 10,660 35.7 34.8 3,704 4,208
1988 205 100,660 42.0 31.0 31,180** 33,994
1989 37 11,019 42.4 58.0 5,399 5,641
1990 316 117,191 49.0 28.4 33,031 33,031
1991* 288 167,542 55.0 26.1 43,782 41,687
Total 1,130 467,867 42.1 26.5 123,887 127,133
Source: Bartholomew (1991).
*Projected.




Incremental Costs of Flexibly Resolving FSLIC's Annual Carryover of
Unresolved Cases Assuming Different Patterns of Per-Dollar
Disposition Costs, 1985-1989 (in $billion)
Yearend 19851986198719881989
(1) Size of FSLICs
Forbearance Equity Position31.8 45.5 45.8 50.8 43.1
(2) DeGennaro-Thomson
Specification of Net 2.9 3.5 2.4 2.5 2.5
Disposition Cost
(2a) Implied Incremental
Liquidation Costs: 34.7 49.0 48.2 53.3 45.6
(3)9% of Assets Specification
of Net DispositionCosts 51.9 62.8 42.8 45.4 44.3
(3a) Implied Incremental
Liquidation Costs: 83.7 108.3 88.6 96.2 87.4
(4)15% of Assets Specification
of Net Disposition Costs 86.4 104.7 71.3 75.6 73.8
(4a) Implied Incremental
Liquidation Costs: 118.2 150.2 117.1 126.4 116.9
(5) Costof Actual Dispositions 1.0 3.1 3.7 31.2 5.4
(6) CumulativeValue ofUnpaid
Post-1985Dividends on ... 6.4 16.7 28.0 40.4
Forbearance Equity21
TableV
Distribution ofRolled-Overand New Zombie Institutions,1986-1989
EndofYear 1986 1987 1988 1989*
(1)No. ofRolled-over Zombies 1073 1194 868 705
(2) No. Recovering Each Year 158 367 115 107
(3) RecoveringCasesReaching MV Net Worth to Assets of More than 3%
(3a) No. of Firms 44 119 34 46
(3b)BVTotal Asset (in $m) 1938590399 1625029236
(3c) MV Net Worth (in Sm) 2007 5573 2242 1400
(4) Recovering Cases Whose MV Net Worth Ratio Fails to Exceed 3%
(4a) No. of Firms 114 248 81 61
(4b)BV TotalAsset (in Sm) 5406421295488008 83553
('Ic) MVNetWorth (inSm) 698 2690 650 1769
(5)No. of Resolutions 46 47 205 37
(6) No. of NewZombies 353 128 174 209
(7) New Zombies Whose MV Net Worth to Ratio Exceeds -3%
(7a) No. of Firms 185 54 97 121
(7b) BV Total Asset (in Sm) 88175 253268747075175
(7c) MV Net Worth (in $m) -1241 -277 -768 -16813
(8) New Zombies Whose MV Net Worth Ratio Fails to Reach -3%
(8a) No. of Firms 168 74 77 88
(8b)BVTotalAsset(in$m) 7575326176123972121272
(8c) MV Net Worth (in $m) -9132 -3937-22744-1250
*Asof end of third quarter.Table VI




Category of Exiense 195 196 1987 1988
Resolution Costs for Institutions
Actually Resolved DuringNext 3.1 3.7 38.0* 5.4
Year (Assumed to be Rolled-Over
Zombies)
FSLIC Forbearance Equity in
UnclosedRolled-OverZombiesat 35.1 41.6 27.2 25.1
Next Yearend
Unpaid Dividends on Forbearance 6.4 9.1 9.2 10.1
Equity (at 20%)
Hypothetical Disposal Costs (9% of 48.9 38.2 26.3 26.6
Assets)
Total Costs with One-Year Deferral 93.5 92.6 100.7 67.2
Hypothetical Cost of Prompt
Liquidation (9%-of-Asset 83.7 108.3 88.6 96.2
Disposal Cost Assumption)
.
Gross Benefitof Deferral 9.8 +15.7 -12.1 +29.0
Forbearance Equity in New Zombies-10.4 -4.2 -23.5 18.I
* Includes18 so-called "stabilizations."23
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